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In this paper I am going to concern myself with the concept of consistency, Gödel’s second 
theorem, and the anti-mechanistic argument of J. Lucas. (1) My approach to the issue involved 
will be somewhat different from the usual logical/philosophical approach which always seems 
to provide the mentalist with a convenient loophole. I will not attempt to give a detailed 
explication of the relevant logical theory, as this is covered adequately elsewhere, but some 
brief statement of my terms of reference is obviously essential. 
Let us begin with a formal logical system S which is adequate for the proofs of all the basic 
results of elementary number theory. Such a system is said to be simply consistent if and only 
if no well-formed formulas A of S is such that A and its negation are both theorems of S, and 
absolutely consistent if and only if at least one formula of S is not a theorem of S. Obviously 
simple consistency implies absolute consistency and vice versa. 
Now Gödel’s second theorem, a corollary of his first, may be expressed approximately as 
follows: if Con s  is an arithmetization of the statement that the first-order theory S is 
consistent, then, if S is sufficiently strong and consistent, Con s  is not provable in S. This may 
be expressed symbolically 
S
 Con s ⊃G where G is the relevant Gödel sentence. Thus if we 
were able to prove the consistency of S within S then, by modus ponens, G would follow, 
which by Gödel’s first theorem would render S inconsistent and leave us with a contradiction. 
Lucas’s paraphrase of Gödel’s second theorem is 
“Gödel has shown that in a consistent system a formula stating the consistency of the system 
cannot be proved in that system”, (2) and whilst such an interpretation is open to serious 
criticism I will not pursue the matter in this context. Using this interpretation as his basis, 
Lucas claims that no consistent machine is capable of producing a computable or computably 
enumerable expression of its own consistency and whilst such a limitation applies to the formal 
reasoning of a human computer, the latter, by means of informal reasoning, is able to transcend 
this limitation and assert his own consistency. Lucas unfortunately does not clearly state what 
he means by informal reasoning or informal logic. One could take it as a reference to that vast 
number of inferences drawn in everyday life which are not, and could not be, codified in any 
formal logic system. Alternatively he could mean by informal logic ‘a theory of valid 
inference’, but whether this sheds any more light on the matter I do not know. Nevertheless, 
the message is clear and simple; by means of informal logic, which Lucas knows is consistent, 
he can informally assert his formal consistency, and since he is formally consistent, so is 
mathematics.  
But how does Lucas know this? 
 
“In saying that a conscious being knows something we are saying not only that he knows it, but 
that he knows that he knows it, and so on, as long as we care to pose the question: there is, we 
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recognize, an infinity here, but it is not an infinite regress in the bad sense, for it is the 
questions that peter out, as being pointless, rather than the answer.” (3)  
 
There are however one or two questions I wish to pose before I peter out. 
I will begin by taking Lucas at his word and define my null hypothesis as “my informal logic 
(reasoning) is consistent”; in case my subsequent analysis leads me to  reject this I will define 
as alternative hypothesis “I do not know whether my informal logic is consistent or not.” Since 
it is Lucas’s contention that the consistency of our informal reasoning is the ultimate guarantee 
of the consistency of mathematics, my null hypothesis allows me to assume the consistency of 
that discipline also. Hence I can use it with confidence. 
In order to test my hypothesis it is then essential that I direct my attention to that disorderly 
field which Lucas claims, establishes my mental superiority over all possible individual 
artefacts. To begin let us assume that our informal mental life-space consists of n propositions, 
A1 , A 2 , …, A n  and their negations, –A1 , –A 2 , …,  –A n , where n is a finite or denumerably 
infinite, natural number, and that an individual mind, in the course of its life, can acquire any 
number of propositions and hold them as axioms. Furthermore, consistency will be taken as the 
analogue of simple consistency in a formal system i.e., a mind will be considered inconsistent 
if it holds any proposition and its negation as axioms. For the purpose of illustration, consider 
the case where n = 2, i.e. the mental life-space consists of four axioms  A1 , A 2 , –A1 ,  –A 2 . 
Now a mind in such an environment could hold  
(a) 1 axiom giving 4 choices 
(b) 2 axioms giving 6 choices 
(c) 3 axioms giving 4 choices 
(d) 4 axioms giving 1 choice. 
 
Within this model it is also easy to demonstrate that 
 
if a mental system consists of 1 axiom it can be inconsistent 0 ways 
if a mental system consists of 2 axioms it can be inconsistent 2 ways 
if a mental system consists of 3 axioms it can be inconsistent 4 ways 
if a mental system consists of 4 axioms it can be inconsistent 1 way. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the relevant outcomes for n = 1, 2,…, 7 and in general, the generating 
formulae are as follows: – 
 
Total number of sets of axioms (consistent and inconsistent) = 2 n2 – 1. 
 
Number of sets of consistent axioms = 3 n – 1, where n = 1, 2, 3, … 
If we now make the assumption that all sets of axioms have equal probability of acceptance by 
a mind then the probability of a mind being inconsistent is given by the function 
12
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and 
it is quite clear from the data of Table 1 that according to such a design the probability of 
accepting an inconsistent set of axioms is extremely high for comparatively small n; thus for n 
grater than 16 the probability exceeds 0.9900. One might initially make the rather naïve point 
that if mathematics is consistent and this were a real-life design, then the chance of anyone 
being informally consistent is very low indeed. There would, statistically, be a tiny minority of 
exceptions and no doubt Lucas would be numbered amongst them. However, the assumption 
that all sets of axioms have equal probability of acceptance is patently false and a conclusion 
such as that suggested above is not valid, though I feel it is a little sobering 
 3
Nevertheless, the exercise has not been futile. Consider once again a mind operating in a space 
consisting of n axioms and their negations. Its informal mental calculus (and it is Lucas who 
says that exists, not I) must consists of 1 axiom or 2 axioms … or 2n axioms together with the 
necessary inferential rules which I am not questioning at this stage. Now the (2 n2 – 1) sets of 
axioms are subdivided into consistent sets numbering (3 n – 1) and inconsistent sets numbering 
(2 n2 – 3 n ). Let us assign probabilities of acceptance p 1 , p 2 , …, p nn 322 −  to the individual 
inconsistent sets and probabilities of acceptance p 1322 +− nn , … p 122 −n  to the consistent sets, 
where p1  +  p 2  + … + p nn 322 − + p 1322 +− nn + … + p 122 −n  = 1. The mind must at any point in 
time hold some set of axioms as being true and the null set is necessarily excluded since if a 
mind is completely agnostic this in itself would constitute an axiom. The probability of a mind 
being consistent, Pr(con), is ∑
−
+−=
1)2n(2
1)n32n2(i
p i  and the probability of being inconsistent 
Pr(Incon), is 1 – Pr(Con) = 1 – ∑i  p i . 
And at this point we run serious difficulties. Despite the fact that we know that for n≥3 the 
number of inconsistent sets is greater than the number of consistent sets we cannot assert that 
Pr(Incon) 〉  Pr(Con) since we have no means of evaluating ∑i p i . The ascription of values 
depends on what I will loosely describe as ‘another source’ and this we could not possibly 
hope to analyse mathematically. It is important to stress here that we are not talking of the 
probability of an axiom being true but only of the probability of an individual mind accepting a 
particular group composed of independent axioms. It is also to be noted that in the case of 
Lucas, Pr(Con) = 1 i.e. his ‘other source or sources’ must confer a probability of unity on his 
acceptance of a particular axiom set and this again cannot be the null set since Lucas does 
believe certain things to be true. 
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I will now consider an obvious criticism that can be levied against this model. It could be 
argued that no one who would be counted as rational, in the general sense of the word, would 
accept any proposition and its negation of axioms; for example, no one would believe that God 
exists and God does not exist, at one and the same time. But, on reflection, one has to admit 
that in real life, propositions are not always presented to us in this clear-cut from; indeed one 
holds such a bewilderingly complex array of axioms that the possibility of detecting all 
inconsistencies must be infinitesimally small. In order to be certain of consistency it would be 
necessary to ascertain the implications of each and every belief and this, surely, would be a 
task beyond human endeavour. Nevertheless, one may press the point and ask whether a mind 
exists which is, conclusively, inconsistent. Some may well regard this question as a joke (with 
perhaps the exception of those who have been on jury service and witnessed informal logic 
applied by respectable citizens of sound mind), but, since most people take exception to being 
called "inconsistent", it must be considered. I will discuss the question initially in a general 
sense before returning to a statistical analysis, the latter of course being a sub-domain of 
consistent mathematics. 
Let us consider, in the first instance, a subject who holds axioms which are patently false. Our 
model is a person with a high level of creativity, who is also extremely competent in the field 
of mathematical logic, but is a confirmed gambler to the extent that he leaves himself 
penniless. That such a person could exist cannot be denied and we must remember that, 
according to Lucas’s schema, this subject can assert the consistency of his formal work by 
reference to his informal reasoning. Now our subject’s ‘gambling axioms’ must belong to the 
latter classification and these would probably consists of one more of the following: – 
 
G1   I am certain I am going to win, eventually. 
 
(Like Lucas and consistency he ‘just knows’ this and ‘just knows that he knows it’ and so on 
for ever backwards until the questions or the money peter out). 
 
G2  I am much more intelligent in the gambling field than most other (or all) gamblers. 
G3   Life itself is but a gamble and no one accumulates great fortunes who is not a gambler. 
 
Now try as we might with arguments from the arsenals of logic and statistics, we cannot get 
him to recognize that these axioms are false. But this does not mean that he is inconsistent; in a 
society of gamblers he would be perfectly consistent. That is my view but I do not think Lucas 
would share it. He has argued that anyone who uses a rule of inference in one situation and 
refuses to use it in another one in order to avoid an inconsistency is inconsistent, tout a fait. 
 
“We do not lay it to a man’s credit that he avoids contradiction merely by refusing to accept 
those arguments which would lead him to it, for no other reason that otherwise he would be led 
to it. Special pleading rather than sound argument is the name for that type of reasoning. No 
credit accrues to a man who, clever enough to see a few moves ahead, avoids being brought to 
acknowledge his own inconsistency by stone-walling as soon as he sees where the argument 
will end. Rather, we account him inconsistent too, not, in his case, because he affirmed and 
denied the same proposition, but because he used and refused to use the same rule of inference. 
A stop-rule on actually enunciating an inconsistency is not enough to save an inconsistent 
system from being called inconsistent.” (4)  
 
This leaves us with a rather pretty problem. Acting on my null hypothesis that mathematics is 
consistent (via informal reasoning) I have come across a person who could well assure me 
(again via his informal reasoning) that mathematics is consistent but whom Lucas would have 
to classify as informally inconsistent. However there is a loophole. Perhaps our gambling 
 6
logician needs informal axioms A1 , …, A k  plus some set of inferential rules to convince 
himself of the consistency of mathematics and this is a different schema from that applied in 
his gambling world. The one could be consistent and the other inconsistent .Or, again, perhaps 
it is an analogous situation to my being able to show that a small portion of the formal system 
representing Principia is consistent whilst being unable to show that the entire system is 
consistent. But if we do assert that the informal logic necessary for knowing mathematics to be 
consistent, is consistent, what grounds have we for stopping there? Could not another 
philosopher make an equal claim regarding his philosophy of life / religious axioms? 
Nevertheless all these arguments are irrelevant to Lucas’s thesis as I will demonstrate. In fact I 
will go further and prove that anyone who believes in his own consistency, and thereby in the 
consistency of mathematics, and has also given serious consideration to any of the arguments 
expressed in this paper is, by that very act, inconsistent. 
I began this investigation by defining as null hypothesis that ‘my informal reasoning is 
consistent’ and by implication mathematics, and considered an informal axiom space 
consisting of 2n independent elements. This space was divided into consistent and inconsistent 
subsets of axioms and on ascribing probability p i  to the event that a particular mind accepts 
subset S i  as its informal axioms or beliefs I found that the probability of such a mind being 
consistent was, Pr(Con) = ip∑
−
+−=
1)2n
n2n
(2
1)32(i
  (n = 1, 2, …). The evaluation of Pr =(Con) 
depends on what I loosely termed as ‘another source’ unknown to me or anyone else, with the 
exception of Lucas who knows that Pr (Con) in his case is unity. Now Lucas knows this 
because he thinks he knows what truth is although, unfortunately, he  
 
“…cannot tell anybody else exactly what it is.” (5)  
 
He believes he is consistent because 
 
“it is, in the language of mathematical theology, an act of faith.” (6)  
 
Lucas, in his paper, seems to interchange the words ‘believe’ and ‘know’ which is reasonable 
since if one knew something to be true than, I presume, one could believe it to be true, although 
one could believe something to be true without knowing it to be true. 
I am now going to make the assumption that I know I am informally consistent, for the same 
reasons as Lucas does. In this paper I have considered some arguments which make me doubt 
this belief and, being a person who thinks he is striving very hard to apply logic in a consistent 
fashion, I must accept these arguments as counter evidence. Representing the probability that I 
am informally consistent (C) because of my Lucasian reasons (L) by Pr (C/L) it follows that Pr 
(C/L, F) Pr (C/L) where F represents my arguments for not –C. Now I know ‘that C’, hence 
Pr (C/L) must be unity. I know also that mathematics is consistent and since Bayeslan Statistics 
is a branch of mathematics I can (using Bayes’ Inversion Theorem) (7) confidently write down 
the equation 
 
Pr(C/L, F) = Pr(C, L) ×
)/Pr(
),/Pr(
LF
CLF
 = 1×
)/Pr(
),/Pr(
LF
CLF
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Again, relying on the consistency of mathematics, it follows that the term 
)/Pr(
),/Pr(
LF
CLF
 must 
be less than or equal to unity i.e. the denominator must not be less than the numerator. 
Furthermore, since the probability of my being informally consistent, given Lucas’s other 
sources’ L, is unity, the probability of my anti-arguments (F) being true given l and C can be 
no smaller than the probability of F given l only. This is so simply because C adds no 
information independent of L. Therefore,, since the numerator of 
)/Pr(
),/Pr(
LF
CLF
 cannot be 
smaller or larger than the denominator it follows that Pr (C/L, F) = 1 ×  1 = 1. 
The immediate implication is of course that no evidence of any kind can refute the claim that I 
am (know myself to be) consistent. But as a person who thinks of himself as being rational, one 
of my informal axioms must be that I make a proper use of reason: and this implies, among 
other things, that I endeavour to correctly estimate the strength of evidence. My knowing that I 
am consistent however obviates this latter estimation. If l is to be a conclusive reason for C 
then L must confer upon C the probability of 1, and this means that no fact F can serve as an 
argument against C, and it seems to me that Lucas or I could not know ourselves to be 
informally consistent unless the evidence L could be expressed in the form of a deductive 
proof. This, as we know, is impossible. 
Let us finally review the situation. I began by accepting as null hypothesis that ‘I am 
informally consistent’, considered a number of arguments against this belief which were not 
and could not be conclusive, but which were strong enough to make me feel happier believing 
the alternative hypothesis that ‘I do not know whether or not I am informally consistent’. I then 
made the assumption that I knew I was consistent (and by implication that I knew mathematics 
to be consistent), expressed my argument in mathematical terms and arrived at a conclusion 
which could only be considered as a travesty of rational thought. The case may be expressed 
symbolically as follows: – 
A:  I know I am informally consistent. 
B:  I know formal logic to be consistent. 
C:  I know mathematics to be consistent. 
1. A ⊃  (B Λ  C)  
2. A                                         This is Lucas’s axiom from (1), (2) 
3. B                                          by Modus Ponens and tautology.  
4. C 
5. C ⊃ –A                                This is the expression of my Bayesian   
                                                         argument. 
6. A ⊃ –C                                from (5) 
7. –C                                        from (2) and (6). 
8. C Λ  –C                               (4) and (7). 
 
The axiom to be rejected is A, that is, for consistency I must conclude that I do not know 
whether or not I am consistent. 
And that concludes my case. The result, it seems to me, is much more intuitively plausible that 
either of the extremes adopted by Lucas or Putnam. (8)  It means of course that Gödel’s 
theorems have no implications for the mechanistic thesis; if we ever do produce a machine 
which, it is claimed, replicates a rational being’s mental functioning, then there is one 
unaskable question. 
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